Platform
Accounts and keys
An account is a tenant. Every credential resolves to exactly one, and the account is taken from the credential and never from the request — which is what makes cross-tenant access impossible rather than merely discouraged. There is no field a caller could set to reach another account's data, because there is no field.
Two kinds of credential
| Integration key | Operator key | |
|---|---|---|
| Looks like | acr_live_… | acr_admin_… |
| Belongs to | One account | Nobody — it is global |
| Scopes | read, write | read, write, money |
| Used by | A client's server | An operator, usually over MCP |
| Reaches | /v1/* | /admin/*, /stats/* |
Both are stored as a SHA-256 hash and nothing else, so a leaked database does not hand over working credentials. Both are shown exactly once, in the response to the call that created them; if one is lost the answer is a new key, not a recovery.
Both are compared in constant time even though they are looked up by hash, so a timing difference cannot distinguish "revoked" from "no such key".
Scopes
Scopes nest: write implies read, and money implies both. A key that lacks
the scope for a route is refused with 403, not 401 — the credential is
valid, it simply may not do this, and telling the two apart is what lets a
caller fix the right thing.
money is never issued to a tenant. It exists for the operator identity and
gates the two calls that create or destroy an operator: minting an admin key,
and revoking one.
Issue the narrowest scope that does the job. A partner service that only draws a leaderboard has no business holding a key that can enrol.
Retiring the shared token
A single ADMIN_TOKEN environment variable once guarded every operator route,
with no actor behind any action. That was the disqualifying finding of the
access-control audit: an append-only record of who did what is impossible when
every action is taken by the same anonymous secret.
Operator keys replace it. The old token still works as a full-scope bridge so
nothing breaks mid-migration, and it records its actions against the stand-in
actor legacy-admin-token. Entries with that actor are the remaining work: each
one is a consumer that has not moved to a key of its own.
One key per person. A key shared between two operators makes the audit trail a lie in a way that is worse than having no audit trail, because it looks like one.
The audit log
Every successful non-GET on an operator or partner route writes one row: the actor, what kind of actor it was, the method and path, and the account it touched.
Reads are not recorded — a read is not an action — and failures are not recorded, because nothing changed. Writing the audit row is best-effort: an outage of that table must never fail the operation it is recording, so it is wrapped and swallowed. Every privileged mutation should still call it.
Read it with GET /admin/audit, optionally filtered to one actor.
Rate limits
Integration keys are limited to 600 requests per minute per key, counted in Postgres as one row per key per minute.
It is counted in the database rather than in memory because the API runs as serverless functions: an in-process counter is per-instance and resets on every cold start, which is to say it is not a limit.
Responses carry x-ratelimit-limit and x-ratelimit-remaining. A 429 carries
retry-after in seconds, exact rather than estimated because the window is
wall-clock aligned.
The limiter fails open. If its own table is unavailable, requests pass. A partner's creator dashboard calls enrolment on every load, and a limiter that can take that down when it has its own outage is worse than no limiter. The failure it defends against is a runaway loop on a client's side, not a determined attacker holding a valid account credential.
Override with V1_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE on the track deployment.
Test mode
Keys carry a livemode flag, and nothing is isolated behind it yet. A test
key would write to the same campaigns, creators and clicks as a live one.
Test keys are therefore not issued. Offering one that implies isolation it does not have would be worse than not offering one at all. A partner integrating should build against a campaign of their own, pointed at a URL they control.